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BARGAINING FOR MOTHERHOOD:
POSTADOPTION VISITATION AGREEMENTS
Carol Sanger*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article is about the use of contract in family formation. More
specifically, I want to look at how contract is now used by parents in the
process of acquiring children and, as we shall see, also as a means of
retaining interests in those same children under the developing regime of
open adoption.
In thinking about the contractual acquisition of relatives, the more
familiar example is probably marriage. We know that historically,
marriages, particularly among the propertied, were often the result of
bargaining between families, if not ministers of state when diplomatic or
dynastic concerns were at stake. Over time, individual men and women
contracted their own marriages with one another. By the nineteenth
century, couples were regarded as contractually bound to one another by
virtue of their engagement alone; thus the lively nineteenth-century
cause of action for breach of the promise to marry.1 There were also less
congenial examples of the contractual acquisition (and de-acquisition) of

* Barbara Aronstein Black Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I am indebted to Joy
Ziegeweid and Priya Merrill (Columbia Law School ’12) and to Jamie Crooks (Columbia Law
School ’13) for their excellent research and continuing discussions on these issues. I want to
specially thank and to remember John Kidwell whose advice and friendship are greatly missed. This
Article was presented as the Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professorship Lecture in
Family Law at Hofstra University School of Law in October 2012. I thank the editors and staff of
the Hofstra Law Review for their careful attention to this Article. I also thank Mark Shulman.
1. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 34-37 (G. Edward White ed., 1985); SASKIA LETTMAIER, BROKEN
ENGAGEMENTS: THE ACTION FOR BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE AND THE FEMININE IDEAL,
1800–1940, at 19-20 (2010).
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spouses.2 Both in England and in the colonies, husbands could sell their
wives, and some did.3
Of course, things have changed over the last few centuries. While
money still changes hands to bring about marriages in certain parts of the
world, for the most part brides are no longer bartered.4 Similarly,
although arranged marriages still exist, the modern practice increasingly
takes the form of parental brokering, with ultimate approval for the
match residing in the couple.5 Consent of the parties is now accepted not
only as a desirable social practice, but importantly, as a legal prerequisite
to marriage under both domestic law and human rights regimes.
Of course, aspects of private contracting still surround and
sometimes structure a marriage even if contract no longer creates it.
Prenuptial agreements are a good example. The assurance of a
background regime of enforceable contracts is understood to bring about
marriages which might otherwise not have been entered. In 1990, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a prenuptial agreement between a
twenty-four-year-old unemployed nurse and a thirty-nine-year-old
neurosurgeon, observing that “[p]arties would not have entered such
agreements, and, indeed, might not have entered their marriages, if they
did not expect their agreements to be strictly enforced.”6 More recently,
in the 2010 case of Granatino v. Radmacher,7 the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom recognized that an important factor in the
enforceability of prenuptial agreements is “whether the marriage would

2. See CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW, AND
SOCIETY IN CONNECTICUT, 1639–1789, at ch. 3 (1995).
3. See generally Julie C. Suk, The Moral and Legal Consequences of Wife-Selling in The
Mayor of Casterbridge (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal
Studies, Working Paper No. 327, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1777555 (discussing a novel’s account of the moral consequences of the wife-sale);
Peter T. Leeson, Peter J. Boettke & Jayme S. Lemke, Wife Sales (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.peterleeson.com/Wife_Sales.pdf (claiming that wife sales show how well
the marriage market works).
4. Significant exceptions include parts of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and a number of
African countries. The practice is not specifically prohibited by the United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”). See U.N. Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No.
21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations (13th Session, 1994), http://www.un.org/women
watch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom21.
5. See Prashina J. Gagoomal, Note, A “Margin of Appreciation” for “Marriages of
Appreciation”: Reconciling South Asian Adult Arranged Marriages with the Matrimonial Consent
Requirement in International Human Rights Law, 97 GEO. L.J. 589, 596-97 (2009).
6. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1990) (emphasis added) (observing that a
rule “invoking inquiries into reasonableness [severely undermines] the functioning and reliability of
prenuptial agreements”).
7. [2010] UKSC 42 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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have gone ahead without an agreement, or without the terms which had
been agreed.”8
This Article focuses on the use of contract not to acquire a spouse,
but for the purpose of obtaining a child. As with wives, children too
were acquired contractually in the past. In the United States, enslaved
children were sold outright, and the custody of free children was
regularly subject to contractual transfer. During the colonial and
republican periods, poor children were often indentured and children in
general often were “placed out” by their parents as apprentices or
domestics with other families.9 These arrangements were highly
contractual; the terms of obligation set out on both sides.10 Actions for
breach of contract were brought by apprentices against masters for
failing to teach them the promised craft and by masters against parents
for harboring runaway apprentices (their own children).11 Masters may
have agreed to certain parent-like obligations—feeding, housing, and
moral education in the case of apprentices. They did not, however,
understand themselves to be acquiring a relation but rather an employee
(in the case of indenture) or a trainee (in the case of apprenticeship).
While such arrangements sometimes resulted in “a familylike legal tie,”
the child did not by virtue of the agreement become a member of the
master’s legal family.12 The transfer of custody was temporary and
largely for vocational purposes.
In this Article, I consider the modern use of contract to transfer the
custody of children, and not for educational or training purposes but
instead, to create the legal relationship of parent and child. In so doing, I
move us out of the early nineteenth century and into the early twentyfirst, where the use of contract to create and acquire children is now
familiar as adults contract to buy both genetic material (eggs, sperm, or
embryos) and gestational services. And not all contracting for children
involves reproductive technology. Foster parents, for example, contract
with the state to raise children, and special “fost-adopt” programs aside,
their parental duties are a contractual form of temporary parenting.
Here, however, I investigate the use of contracts for permanent
parenting. I focus on adoption and, within that context, on a new
category of contract: the postadoption visitation agreement. I have
8. Id. at para. 72.
9. See 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, VOLUME I: 1600–
1865, at 103-05 (Robert H. Bremmer et al. eds., 1970); JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH:
FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY 70-71 (1970).
10. See DEMOS, supra note 9, at 71-72; MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 39 (1994).
11. See, e.g., DEMOS, supra note 9, at 71, 113.
12. See GROSSBERG, supra note 1, at 259-60.
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chosen this topic in part because I teach both contracts and family law,
and so connections between the two—private ordering in the quasipublic realm—have become part of my world view. There is no telling
what intimates will get up to with one another when you put the
possibility of a deal in front of them. But in this area of truly private
ordering—family creation—I am concerned not only with the use of
contract but with the integrity of its use. It is precisely where law
intersects intimacy, with its constitutional implications, that the legal
system must be particularly careful about the seemingly straightforward
application of contract doctrine.
II. ADOPTION TRANSFORMED
To understand how contract has made its way into adoption, it helps
to understand how in the last few decades adoption practices in the
United States have evolved from a regime of closed and confidential
proceedings into the more transparent process known as open adoption.
In a traditional closed adoption, the unmarried birth mother surrendered
her parental rights (and where known, the birth father his) to the state or
to a licensed private adoption agency.13 The agency then selected an
appropriate married couple from its applicant pool to become the infant’s
new parents. Following a satisfactory home study, the family or probate
court then issued an order declaring the adoption to be in the baby’s best
interest, and the childless couple was transformed into legal parents with
a baby of their very own.
The combination of termination of the birth mother’s parental
rights—“the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship,
with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child’s
parent or parents”14—and the final adoption decree—“[a]ll rights, duties
and other legal consequence of the biological relation of child and parent
shall thereafter exist between the adopted person and the adopting
parent”15—created a new legal family and obliterated the old. The birth
mother would have no idea where her child had gone or who the
adoptive parents were, and they, in turn, knew very little about her.
Indeed, the baby’s original birth certificate was sealed, and a new one
issued with the adoptive parents’ names filled in as the parents from the
date of birth. Under prevailing mid-century ideology, this process was
13. Some states also permit private adoptions brokered through attorneys. See JOAN H.
HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.04[1] (1991). States also sometimes permit
adoption by single people. See id. at § 3.06[5].
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-707(8) (West Supp. 2012).
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a–731(1) (West 2004).
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understood as a domestic trifecta. The birth mother could move on with
her own life free from the burdens and stigma of unwed motherhood.
The adoptive parents could proceed with a facsimile (legal and often
physiological) of biological parenthood, their reproductive secrets safe
and their domestic privacy protected. And the child himself would be
raised by loving and enthusiastic parents whose dominion over their
child was as complete as any natural parent.
Beginning in the 1970s, the logic of this system of secrecy began to
unravel as adult adoptees, acting individually and through fledgling
organizations such as the Adoptees’ Liberty Movement Association
(“ALMA”),16 began to challenge the view that they were better off not
knowing anything about their birth families. Adoptees were supported in
their efforts by research findings identifying “genealogical
bewilderment” and “identity lacunae” in adopted children, particularly
during adolescence.17 There was also an uncanny cultural phenomenon:
the widespread popularity of Alex Haley’s Roots.18 Both the book and
the subsequent television program sparked great interest in the pursuit of
one’s origins; Roots “diminished [adoptees’] sense of marginality” in
seeking their roots.19 Best-selling confessional books such as Betty Jean
Lifton’s Twice Born: Memoirs of an Adopted Daughter20 added to the
interest in the lot of adopted people and contributed to a cultural
rethinking of closed adoption.21 Adoptee rights campaigns were not
entirely successful as a matter of law; courts rejected constitutional
claims that confidentiality provisions violated an adoptee’s fundamental
right to personhood.22 Nonetheless, legislatures began to authorize states
to collect and adult adoptees to retrieve at least non-identifying
information about birth parents such as their ethnicity and
medical histories.23
16. ALMA SOC’Y: ADOPTEES’ LIBERTY MOVEMENT ASS’N, http://www.almasociety.org/
(last visited Mar. 29, 2013). The more radical Bastard Nation has since joined ALMA. BASTARD
NATION: ADOPTEE RTS. ORG., http://www.bastards.org/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
17. See Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Perspectives on Open Adoption, FUTURE CHILD.,
Spring 1993, at 119, 120 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that adopted children “live with
the knowledge that an essential part of their personal history remains on the other side of the
adoption barrier”). But see E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE
HISTORY OF ADOPTION 219 (1998) (noting a contrary view that both “open and closed adoption
advocates marshaled pseudoscience to advance their positions”).
18. ALEX HALEY, ROOTS (Doubleday 1976) (1974).
19. JUDITH S. MODELL, A SEALED AND SECRET KINSHIP: THE CULTURE OF POLICIES AND
PRACTICES IN AMERICAN ADOPTION 35 (2002); see also CARP, supra note 17, at 163-64.
20. BETTY JEAN LIFTON, TWICE BORN: MEMOIRS OF AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER (1975).
21. See CARP, supra note 17, at 138-39.
22. See generally, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. 1981) (upholding confidentiality
statute against constitutional challenge).
23. See Marci J. Blank, Note, Adoption Nightmares Prompt Judicial Recognition of the Tort
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At about the same time, women who had placed children for
adoption in the past began to step forward and identify themselves, at
least to one another. As a social group, birth mothers have been a largely
invisible category of mother. As birth mother Jan Waldron observed,
“There are millions of birthmothers in this country, yet most people will
tell you they’ve never met one.”24 In the pre-Internet days of the 1980s,
when supportive communities were hard to identify and to mobilize,
birth mothers began to meet in living rooms and church basements under
the auspices of fledgling support groups, such as Concerned United
Birthmothers (“CUB”).25 These groups offered a welcome forum for
birth mothers who wanted to discuss feelings of loss and regret and their
dissatisfactions with their treatment in law. CUB founder Lee H.
Campbell acknowledged a debt: “[W]e’re grateful to you Adoptees for
waking us up. If you hadn’t come out of the closet, we birth mothers
would be in pain forever.”26 As with adult adoptees, birth mothers rarely
prevailed in court in their efforts to open sealed adoption records.27 Yet
states began to create official registries where birth parents and adult
children could inquire about one another, and if both agreed, there was
the possibility of reunion.28
These early forms of adoption activism by adoptees and birth
mothers took place against a perfect demographic storm regarding the
availability of eligible newborns. The decriminalization of abortion in
1973, the advent of the contraceptive pill in the 1960s, and the reduced
social and legal stigma of unwed motherhood resulted in a significant
decrease in the number of infants placed for adoption. As the National
Committee for Adoption stated in 1989, “[m]ore than a million couples
are chasing the 30,000 white infants available in the country each
year.”29 In consequence, the market power of birth mothers increased,
of Wrongful Adoption: Will New York Follow Suit?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1687, 1725 n.225 (1994)
(compiling state statutes providing access to various types of adoption information).
24. JAN L. WALDRON, GIVING AWAY SIMONE: A MEMOIR xvii (1995).
25. CONCERNED UNITED BIRTHPARENTS, http://www.cubirthparents.org/ (last visited Mar. 29,
2013).
26. CARP, supra note 17, at 204.
27. See, e.g., In re Christine, 397 A.2d 511, 513 (R.I. 1979) (noting the “heavy burden” birth
mothers must bear to establish a claim for access to sealed records). Birth mothers also failed in later
efforts to keep adoption records secret retroactively. See, e.g., Does v. State, 993 P.2d 822, 836 (Or.
1999).
28. See, e.g., Adoption Registry, ST. N.J. DEP’T CHILD. & FAMILIES,
http://www.nj.gov/njfosteradopt/adoption/registry/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); Central Adoption
Registry, TEX. DEP’T ST. HEALTH SERVICES, http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/vs/reqproc/adoption
registry.shtm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
29. Cynthia Crossen, In Today’s Adoptions, the Biological Parents Are Calling the Shots,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1989, at A1; see also It’s a Seller’s Market, LIFE, Sept. 1988, at 80 (noting
that 100 couples vie for each healthy Caucasian infant).
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and adoption agencies began to pay serious attention to what it would
take to get mothers to place their newborns for adoption.
The answer was understood to be greater control over the adoption
process. This power manifested itself in two ways. The first concerned
the selection of the adoptive parents which within a relatively short
period of time, moved from agency social workers to birth mothers
themselves. Agencies began to act more as brokers, compiling and
presenting the carefully drafted letters and resumes received from their
childless clients to pregnant women and girls considering adoption.30 As
birth mothers began to know the identity, background, and location of
the adoptive parents—after all, they had chosen them—the
confidentiality and secrecy of adoption records became relics in a
collapsing regime.
III.

EARLY POSTADOPTION AGREEMENTS

In addition to giving birth mothers primary control in choosing the
adoptive parents, the second incentive for placement was the possibility
of ongoing communication and even contact between birth mothers and
adoptive families. That is, birth mothers wanted to know not only where
and with whom their child was placed, but how he or she was doing over
time. With the help of agency social workers, birth parents and adoptive
families began to negotiate the extent and form that post-adoption
contact might take. The resulting agreements typically included the
promise of photographs and progress reports to the birth mother and
sometimes even scheduled visits between the birth mother and the
adopted child.
And the legal status of such agreements? The question arose most
often when the adoptive parents decided that the arrangement was not
working and discontinued visitation. In such cases, the birth mother
would sue to have the agreement specifically enforced. The earliest cases
seeking birth mother visitation in the days of closed adoption were quite
clear about the outcome: nothing doing. Because adoption is a legal
status completely created by statute, parties could not, by agreement, add
to or detract from whatever rights and duties the state had fixed. Recall
that closed adoption statutes provided for the comprehensive and
mandatory substitution of adoptive parent for birth parent.31 As the
Oregon Supreme Court explained in the early 1950s, “[w]hen the
30. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, AN OPEN ADOPTION 49 (1990).
31. For an account of “outlaw” open adoption in the days of closed adoption, see Barbara
Yngvesson, Negotiating Motherhood: Identity and Difference in “Open” Adoptions, 31 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 31, 39-48 (1997).
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adoption took place, a new status in the life of the child was created; its
care,
nurture,
well-being,
and
all
the
incidents
of
parenthood . . . devolved upon the adoptive parents. Old ties were
severed and it was off with the old, and on with the new, so to speak.”32
The policies behind the total severance between birth mother and
child were two-fold: to advance the well being of adoptive children and
to secure the authority of adoptive parents. As a 1937 Maryland decision
explained, without this finality “an adoptive infant would be
subject . . . to the conflicting authority or custody of the natural and
adoptive parents.”33 In the 1980s, however, courts began to take account
of developing shifts in law and in sentiment regarding open adoption,
and they began to reassess the nonenforceability of visitation
agreements. Most of the cases from the period involved mothers who
had existing relationships with their children prior to the adoption; the
adopted children were children, not newborns, who had lived with their
birthmothers for some time.
Consider a 1983 Maryland decision, which upheld a written
agreement between the natural mother, Sally, and her former husband
and his new wife, Shirley.34 Sally had consented to Shirley’s adoption of
the children on the understanding that “SALLY’s right to visitation is an
integral part of this Agreement.”35 When Shirley later withheld
visitation, Sally sought to have the arrangement enforced.36
Characterizing the agreement as “unusual,” the court noted that “[b]eing
unusual . . . does not make it illegal, against public policy, or contrary to
the best interests of the child.”37 Nothing in Maryland’s adoption statute
“purport[s] to mandate that the adoptive parents and the natural parents
may not under any circumstance agree to visitation privileges by the
natural parents.”38
A Connecticut court reached the same conclusion in 1988,
upholding a visitation agreement between the natural mother of a fouryear-old child and his adoptive parents.39 The court found that the
agreement had been “openly and lovingly negotiated, in good faith, in
order to promote the best interest of the child” and that the child herself
thought the agreement between her mother and her soon-to-be adoptive

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Whetmore v. Fratello, 252 P.2d 1083, 1083 (Or. 1953).
Spencer v. Franks, 195 A. 306, 310 (Md. 1937).
Weinschle v. Strople, 466 A.2d 1301, 1306 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
Id. at 1303.
See id.
Id. at 1305.
Id. at 1306.
Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738, 738, 742 (Conn. 1988).
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parents would be “the best world that she could imagine.”40 Noting that
Connecticut had a general statute authorizing third party visitation when
in the best interests of a child, the court concluded that “[i]t would be
elevating form over substance to allow the plaintiff to obtain visitation
rights by filing an appropriate ‘application’ in the Superior Court, but to
deny her the opportunity to seek such rights under a contractual
umbrella.”41
Similarly, in Groves v. Clark,42 the Montana Supreme Court made
clear that “natural parents and prospective adoptive parents may contract
for post-adoption visitation and that,” when in the best interests of the
adopted child, “such agreements should be enforced.”43 In that case,
Debbie Groves had consented to the adoption of her four-year-old
daughter Laci by Lonn and Loralee Clark upon the express condition
that the Clarks sign a visitation agreement.44 This they did: “We, Lon
and Loralee Clark, are willing to honor Debbie Groves’ wishes regarding
her requests for contact with Laci Lee Groves.”45 When the Clarks cut
off visitation, Debbie sought enforcement.46 In remanding the case for a
best interests determination, the court carefully underscored the nature of
Debbie’s claim.47 It was “not premised on an ongoing genetic
relationship that somehow survives a termination of parental rights and
an adoption,” but rather on a continued contractual right to visit a child
with whom she had an ongoing relationship.48
Such decisions took a broader, more contemporary view of the best
interests of adopted children and of the nature of American families. The
Connecticut Supreme Court observed that it was “not prepared to assume
that the welfare of children is best served by a narrow definition of those
whom we permit to continue to manifest their deep concern for the
child’s growth and development.”49
Courts further acknowledged a relationship between postadoption
visitation and a birth mother’s decision to place her child in the
first place:
[visitation agreements do] not appear to run counter to public policy
inasmuch as [they] will not ordinarily impede adoptions, but might
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 741.
920 P.2d 981 (Mont. 1996).
Id. at 985.
Id. at 982.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 982-83.
See id. at 985.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738, 740 (Conn. 1988)).
Michaud, 551 A.2d at 742.
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even foster them in those cases where the natural parent and adoptive
parent are known to each other and the natural parent is reluctant to
50
yield all contact with his or her child.

This concern has also had implications for interracial adoption.51 In
1992, the Hartleys, a non-Indian couple, adopted two-year-old F.H., an
Indian child.52 F.H.’s birth mother had relinquished her parental rights to
the Hartleys upon the condition that she and the birth family retain
contact and visitation rights with F.H.53 The Native Village of Noatak, a
registered Indian tribe, sought to have the adoption set aside as a
violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (the “ICWA”),54
which provides a hierarchy of adoption placement preferences, starting
with members of the child’s extended family, then other members of the
child’s tribe, and finally with any other Indian family.55 Nonetheless, the
trial court found that on these facts there was good cause to deviate from
the ICWA placement preferences.56 Not only was there an established
bond between the Hartleys and F.H., but also because the adoption was
open in character, the arrangement gave the birth mother access to F.H.,
thereby “possibly giving F.H. exposure to her Native American
heritage.”57
Yet not all courts were convinced about enforcing visitation
agreements. In 2000, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that a
postadoption visitation agreement—“one visit a year with the mom”—
was not specifically enforceable.58 Because open adoption legislation
had been enacted shortly after the adoption in question, the court agreed
that such agreements were “not necessarily repugnant to public
policy.”59 Nonetheless, the court concluded that because the new
legislation was unambiguously non-retroactive in application, “all the
respondent’s parental rights were obliterated and any alleged agreement
vanished.”60 The New Jersey Supreme Court similarly declined to
uphold a visitation agreement, finding that the agreement was intended
only to “enable” the birth mother to be a part of the baby’s life, but it did
50. Weinschel v. Strople, 466 A.2d 1301, 1306 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
51. Jacqueline Macaulay & Stewart Macaulay, Adoption for Black Children: A Case Study of
Expert Discretion, RES. L. & SOC’Y, no. 1, 1978 at 265, 267.
52. In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Alaska 1993).
53. Id.
54. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2006); see In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1363.
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1915.
56. In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1363.
57. Id.; see also Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 304-06 (Mass. 2000).
58. In re Alicia S., 763 A.2d 643, 645, 647 (R.I. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. at 646.
60. Id. at 647.
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not require an on-going relationship between the two.61 In so holding,
the court observed that the New Jersey legislature had recently declined
to enact a postadoption visitation statute, noting further that “[c]ourts
have differed with respect to the clarity and strength of public policy on
the issue of ‘open adoptions’ under their respective statutory schemes.”62
IV.

POSTADOPTION VISITATION STATUTES

In the last twenty years, states have significantly revised their
statutory schemes regarding open adoption in general and postadoption
visitation in particular. By 2011, twenty-six states and the District of
Columbia had enacted laws providing for some form of enforceable
agreement between birth parents and adoptive parents.63 While the
statutes differ in interesting ways, each provides that postadoption
visitation agreements are legal so long as the agreement is in writing and
approved by the court, most often by being incorporated into the final
order of adoption. The statutes also specify the type of contact to which
the parties may agree. These include actual visitation, the sharing of
information (identifying or non-identifying), and other forms of
communication, such as letters and photographs. Information may be
exchanged directly or through an adoption agency.
The statutes further clarify who may seek visitation with an adopted
child. All include the birth parents, but several include other birth
relatives, such as siblings and grandparents, aunts and uncles. Minnesota
permits visitation by foster parents.64 When the adopted child is an
Indian child, three states—California, Minnesota, and Oklahoma—
provide that members of the child’s tribe may seek visitation.65 States
also specify which children can be the subject of a postadoption
visitation agreement. While most statutes apply to any adopted child,
Connecticut and Nebraska permit visitation only with children adopted
from foster care; Indiana limits coverage to foster children who are two
and over.66 In this way, some states distinguish between older children

61. In re Adoption of Child by D.M.H. & S.H., 641 A.2d 235, 245 (N.J. 1994).
62. Id. at 244-45.
63. For an overview of each state, see generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY,
POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN BIRTH AND ADOPTIVE FAMILIES (2011),
available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/cooperative.pdf.
64. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.58 (West 2007).
65. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (Supp. 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.58; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 7505-1.5 (West 2009).
66. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-715 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16.5-1 (West
2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-162 (LexisNexis 2011).
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who are more likely to have known their birth families and newborns
who are not.
Anticipating that visitation may not always go smoothly, a number
of statutes require the parties to participate in mediation before they may
seek specific performance of a postadoption visitation in court.
Importantly, at the time enforcement is sought, the court must determine
whether visitation is in the child’s best interests,67 and a few provide that
the court may consider the wishes of older children, if twelve years or
older—Arizona and Louisiana; in New Hampshire, Oregon, and
Virginia, if over fourteen.68
A 2010 Louisiana case highlights how this is all supposed to work.
The postadoption visitation agreement “clearly and unambiguously”
stated that the grandparents were granted permanent care and custody of
the children “subject to reasonable, supervised visitation by [the birth
parents], to be supervised by the court should the parties be unable to
agree to the visitation schedule.”69 Noting that “[w]hen the words of a
contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, the
intent of the parties is to be determined by the words of the contract,” the
court ordered that the provisions of the consent judgment be enforced
according to its terms.70
These new contractual arrangements reflect new family structures.
For example, in Adoption of S.K.L.H.,71 an Alaska teenager agreed to the
adoption of her new baby by her own father and stepmother, having
bargained with them for liberal postadoption visitation.72 In upholding
the adoption, the court noted that:
the child’s living situation will tend to foster the kind of open adoption
that must have been contemplated: (1) the parties live in a small
community; (2) the child will be raised by her biological

67. See, e.g., State ex rel. C.S., 2010-0687, pp. 6-9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/10/10); 49 So. 3d 38,
42-43 (holding that “[w]hen the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd
consequences, the intent of the parties is to be determined by the words of the contract” and that
“[t]herefore, the provisions of the consent judgment should be enforced according to its terms”); see
also In re Heidi E., 889 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763-64 (App. Div. 2009) (remanding the case to the family
court for determination on whether or not an annual visit was detrimental to the child).
68. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-116.01 (2007); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1269.5 (Supp.
2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:14 (Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.305 (Supp.
2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1220.3 (2012).
69. State ex rel. C.S., 2010-0687, p. 9; 49 So. 3d at 43.
70. Id. at pp. 8-9, 49 So. 3d at 43.
71. 204 P.3d 320 (Alaska 2009).
72. Id. at 322.

2012]

POSTADOPTION VISITATION AGREEMENTS

321

grandparents; . . . and (4) Donna will be the child’s adoptive sister as
73
well as biological mother.

The court noted that, in this case, the adoptive parents were keeping two
baby books for the child, one reflecting the child’s biological parents and
the other, the child’s adoptive family.74
The fairly widespread enactment of these statutes, the variety of
contracts entered under their auspices, and the developing case law make
clear that open adoption is now a familiar and expected part of adoption
practice and culture. It is the subject of workshops and continuing
education programs put on by lawyers who specialize in the area, and it
is a ubiquitous feature on adoption agency websites.75 Indeed, most
adoptions in the United States are now open in some respect. Details
from a set of actual agreements give the individualized flavor of the
bargains: “The Adopting Parents . . . shall provide the Maternal
Aunt . . . with a ‘letter of update’ two times each year describing the
minor’s adjustment, developmental progress and any significant
achievements;” the parties “shall utilize ‘skype’ as a method of contact
every other month for the first seven (7) years of the Child’s life;” “Birth
Mother agrees to not put any photos, now or forever . . . on Facebook or
other public website without the express written permission of the
Adoptive Parents.”76
To review, open adoption provided a way to formally secure the
interests and preferences of birth mothers and of adoptive parents. The
birth mother, often unmarried, recognizes that the demands of
motherhood are too much for her at present; at the same time, she does
not want to abort (or perhaps it is too late to do so legally). Adoption is
at once sensible, maternal (doing what is best for the baby), and altruistic
(making the adoptive couple very happy). Even so, to reject motherhood

73. Id. at 332-33.
74. Id. at 333.
75. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GOLDSTEIN & DEBBIE S. WOLF, POST-ADOPTION CONTACT
AGREEMENT (PACA) CAN LEAD TO SHORTER TIME IN FOSTER CARE 1 (2011), available at
http://www.nysccc.org/wp-content/uploads/PACA-Presentation-Goldstein-2011.pdf (including a
PowerPoint presentation at the New York State Citizens’ Coalition for Children’s 2011 conference).
76. ATTACHMENT: ADOPT-310, ITEM 3—OTHER TYPES OF CONTACT, available at
http://www.nysccc.org/wp-content/uploads/PACA-A.pdf; POST ADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENT
B, available at http://www.nysccc.org/wp-content/uploads/PACA-B.pdf; POST ADOPTION CONTACT
AGREEMENT D, available at http://www.nysccc.org/wp-content/uploads/PACA-D.pdf. Four
redacted contracts are available at the New York State Citizen’s Coalition for Children’s website,
labeled as PAC Agreement Examples A, B, C, and D. See ATTACHMENT: ADOPT-310, ITEM 3—
OTHER TYPES OF CONTACT, supra (noting Example A); POST ADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENT B,
supra; POST ADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENT C, available at http://www.nysccc.org/wpcontent/uploads/PACA-C.pdf; POST ADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENT D, supra.
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and become a “legal stranger” to one’s child, knowing that the child is
out there somewhere, is for some women, a hard bargain indeed.
Postadoption visitation agreement statutes soften the situation. With
an agreement in place, the birth mother may no longer be the child’s
legal mother, but neither is she a stranger at law. She can provide her
child with loving and able parents while preserving a bond for herself
that while no longer legally parental, is still meaningful. Even so, her
decision is understood as difficult, and she herself is understood to be
doing something close to heroic. This sense of valor is emphasized by
adoption agencies. As one birth mother testimonial on the Catholic
Charities USA adoption website states, “Giving up my little angel for
adoption was the hardest thing I’ve ever done.”77
Adoptive parents are also understood to benefit from the
arrangement. As already noted, the practice of open adoption is
understood to contribute to an ongoing supply of desirable newborns.
Open adoption may also benefit the adoptive parents and their child from
a developmental perspective. The adoptive parents accept, as evidenced
by their willingness to open adoption, that transparency about origins is
good for their child and that it will not threaten their own status as legal
parents.78 Finally, open adoption provides the adoptive parents with a
keen understanding of the birth mother’s regard for her child. After
watching the birth mother of his adoptive son “crumple into a ball
sobbing” when adoptive father Dan Savage and his partner left the
hospital with their new baby, Savage explains “the logic of open
adoption, its absolute necessity”:
In a closed adoption, we wouldn’t have witnessed the moment our
son’s mother gave him up. . . . Because of open adoption, we’ll be able
to sit him down and tell him about this day; we’ll be able to describe
the moment Melissa gave him to us, and how hard it was for her. We
won’t have to guess at what it was like, or tell him that we’re sure his
79
mother loved him. We know she loved him; we saw it.

77. Catholic Charities USA, PARENTFINDER (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.parentfinder.com/m/
sites/view/Catholic-Charities-USA (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Adoption, CATH.
CHARITIES USA, http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/what-we-do/programs/adoption/ (last visited
Mar. 29, 2013).
78. See Baran & Pannor, supra note 17, at 122-23 (noting that birth parents benefit by being
able to cope after the adoption, the adopted child benefits by experiencing diminished feelings of
rejection, and adoptive parents benefit by being able to provide the child with background
knowledge based on first-hand knowledge). But see CATHERINE MACASKILL, SAFE CONTACT?:
CHILDREN IN PERMANENT PLACEMENT AND CONTACT WITH THEIR BIRTH RELATIVES 136-37
(2002) (concluding that the majority of “children were resolute in their wish to see their birth
relatives” but that contact can also provoke painful, dormant feelings).
79. DAN SAVAGE, THE KID (WHAT HAPPENED AFTER MY BOYFRIEND AND I DECIDED TO GO
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The law, too, is fairly satisfied. Postadoption visitation agreement
statutes facilitate the preferences of birth parents and adoptive parents
while retaining the court’s traditional supervisory role over the welfare
of the child. To return to the idea of acquiring children, the agreements
both create and preserve parent-child relationships. Indeed, the
preservation appears to be what makes the creation possible by providing
a background legal regime against which the mother’s voluntary
relinquishment and her assurance of contact take place.80 One might say
that the agreements are to adoption what prenuptial agreements are to
marriage: a species of contract that facilitate the primary relationship—
whether wedlock or parenthood—and that make the acquisition of
relatives—whether spouses or children—possible. If the adoptive parents
renege, the birth mother can seek specific performance, unless, of
course, the court finds visitation is not in the child’s best interest. This
all sounds very good and very promising.
Yet, things are seldom what they seem. Postadoption contact
agreements may not be skimmed milk but neither, on closer inspection,
are they always cream. That is because it turns out that unwed pregnant
girls who are not quite ready for motherhood—young women regarded
sympathetically, even perhaps gratefully—are not the only women who
enter into postadoption visitation agreements. This is where our story
becomes more complicated and my celebration of contract as the special
relational glue that only law can provide becomes somewhat messier.
V.

A HARDER LOOK

Although the imagined poster girl for open adoption may be the
white, unwed, college-bound student who struggles with her decision but
ultimately does the right thing by her baby, it turns out that many of the
cases seeking enforcement of postadoption visitation agreements are
brought by women with a very different profile. These are women who
never wanted to relinquish their children for adoption in the first place,
but whose children have been removed by the state on account of abuse
or neglect. These are women whose parental rights the state seeks to
terminate involuntarily.
And here, a shadow set of legal rules surfaces and comes into play.
The first and crucial rule is this: involuntary termination permanently
GET PREGNANT): AN ADOPTION STORY 216 (1999). For a fictional account of the problems created
when the adoptive parents have nothing to tell their child, see generally ELYSE GASCO, Mother: Not
a True Story, in CAN YOU WAVE BYE BYE, BABY? 191 (1999).
80. See Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 80-81 (2007) (discussing the role of contract attempting to stabilize the
market in the case of children acquired through reproductive surrogacy).
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and comprehensively severs the legal parent-child relationship.
However, if a negligent or abusive mother agrees to terminate her
parental rights voluntarily, then she, too, can bargain for some form of
contact under the postadoption visitation statutes. Indeed, it turns out
that many mothers facing involuntary termination are advised by their
social workers or attorneys to do exactly that. In her study of parental
termination cases over a ten-year period in St. Joseph County, Indiana,
law professor Hillary Baldwin concludes that “[k]nowing that a
termination petition is imminent, and feeling as if they probably will not
win,” many parents decide to “give up their children for adoption” rather
than have them taken away.81 “[V]oluntary termination gives the parent
his only chance to work out a post-adoption visitation agreement. If the
termination proceeds involuntarily, the parent risks never seeing the
child again.”82 In Professor Baldwin’s study, in only three of 303
termination cases brought by the state did the parent retain his or her
child.83 Professor Baldwin observes that “[i]f statistically a parent’s
chance is less than one percent that the court will dismiss an open
termination case, word will get around.”84
This presents a more complicated set of cases—more complicated
because there is a longer familial history, because the state is more
directly involved, and because the voluntariness of consent becomes
more suspect against these facts. As might be expected, in such cases
visitation does not always work out as planned, and adoptive parents
may cut off or suspend visitation. Reasons have included ongoing
maternal drug problems,85 missed visitation,86 or simply because
visitation is no longer thought to be in the child’s best interests. In a
2006 Massachusetts case, a court found that because “[u]nexpectedly
(and happily)” an adoptive home had been found for the children and
because they were adjusting well to the adoptive home and parents, it
was not in their best interests to continue visitation with their
biological mother.87
The remedy this new category of birth mother tends to seek,
however, is not specific enforcement of the visitation agreement, but
81. Hilary Baldwin, Termination of Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Proposed
Solutions, 28 J. LEGIS. 239, 269, 274 (2002).
82. Id. at 274.
83. Id.
84. Id. I will return to the question of why so few mothers prevail in their attempts to keep
their children. See infra text accompanying notes 153-56.
85. See, e.g., In re Judicial Surrender of Daijuanna Priscilla M., 735 N.Y.S.2d 544, 545 (App.
Div. 2002).
86. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Mya V.P., 913 N.Y.S.2d 477, 477-78 (App. Div. 2010).
87. Adoption of Edgar, 853 N.E.2d 1068, 1074-75 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
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rescission of the entire deal. They want to revoke their consent to the
adoption itself and have their own parental rights restored. This makes
some sense in that these mothers never wanted to have their children
adopted in the first place; voluntary termination was a means of avoiding
the dire consequences of involuntary termination. Their argument is that
the voluntary termination of those rights was expressly conditioned on
ongoing visitation, and absent that, the entire arrangement is off. The
case is put clearly in In re Joe C. v. Mary Ann S.,88 a 2005 California
case: The natural mother “claims she is entitled to reversal of the order
terminating parental rights because she did not receive what she
bargained for, namely [an enforceable] postadoption contact
agreement.”89 The mother argued that she “forfeited her right to a
contested hearing as to whether the court should terminate her parental
rights in return for a valid and enforceable postadoption contact
agreement.”90
Here the formation process—the exact circumstances under which
the postadoption visitation agreement are entered—becomes key. Under
state adoption laws, once an adoption is final, the only grounds for the
revocation of parental consent are the traditional equitable defenses of
fraud, mistake, undue influence, and misrepresentation. As we shall see,
these defenses are seldom successful. But their occasional success seems
to depend in part on just what kind of mother is seeking to overturn the
adoption. This is made clear in a comparison of two Texas cases, the
first involving a good girl gone temporarily wrong; the second involving
a mother who failed to protect her baby from abuse.
In Vela v. Marywood,91 Corina, a nineteen-year-old, unmarried birth
mother sought to rescind her consent to the surrender of her infant.92
While pregnant, Corina had gone to Marywood, a licensed adoption
agency, to learn about adoption.93 Her Marywood “maternity counselor”
explained that in an open adoption, Corina would “always be the child’s
birth mother;” that she would “always have a relationship with . . . [her]
child;” that the baby would have “two mothers, both of whom would
have input into his life;” “and that that the birth family would be like the
child’s extended family.”94 Corina and her mother testified that these

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

No. F047570, 2005 WL 2008461 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2005).
Id. at *2.
Id.
17 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. App. 2000).
Id. at 753, 757.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 753 n.2, 755 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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representations were “the only reason she signed” the relinquishment
affidavit surrendering her parental rights.95
The Texas court held that, as a matter of law, Marywood’s
“statements and omissions to Corina constituted misrepresentation,
fraud, or overreaching.”96 This was so in part because Marywood’s close
counseling relationship with Corina created a fiduciary relationship.97
Marywood was therefore bound “in equity and good conscience” to act
in good faith and to fully disclose that the ‘shared parenting plan’ had no
legal effect at all.98 Throughout the decision, the court radiates
sympathy, even fondness, for Corina and her family. The court
introduces Corina in the second line as “an exemplary young woman
who made a mistake,” and it devotes a paragraph to her record of
community service, her strong and supportive parents, and testimony
characterizing Corina as “the envy of all the mothers in the
neighborhood.”99
But not all birth mothers are regarded so warmly, and it is worth
figuring out why and where the boundaries are set. With that in mind, I
return to a 2009 Texas case, In re D.E.H.100 D.E.H. was seven months
old when she was removed from her unmarried parents on grounds of
abuse: the baby had been beaten by her father and suffered “two
fractures to each femur, four fractures to each tibia, multiple rib
fractures . . . , a liver contusion, and a spleen laceration.”101 D.E.H. was
placed in foster care, and the Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services (“DFPS”) moved to terminate the parental rights of the father
and of the baby’s mother, E.L.102 The father’s rights were involuntarily
terminated, but following a mediation with her attorney and the baby’s
pre-adoptive foster parents, E.L. agreed to relinquish her parental rights
and entered into a post-termination agreement with the foster parents.103
A month later, E.L. sought to have her consent withdrawn on the
grounds of fraud, duress, and coercion.104 Her claim was that she had
been told that if the termination case against her went to trial, “the likely
outcome would be that she would . . . never see [her child] again” and
that her only other option was to sign the affidavit of relinquishment and
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 755 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 763.
See id. at 760-61.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 752-53.
301 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. App. 2009).
Id. at 826.
Id.
Id. at 826 & n.1.
Id. at 827.

2012]

POSTADOPTION VISITATION AGREEMENTS

327

enter into an agreement for limited visitation.105 As E.L. put it, she
“didn’t have any way out.”106
Each of these defenses proved a loser. After reviewing the
evidence, the court concluded that “E.L. failed to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that execution of the affidavit . . . in
exchange for an allegedly legally unenforceable promise resulted from
fraud, duress, or coercion.”107 Coercion, the court explained, “occurs if
someone is compelled to perform an act by force or threat;” duress
occurs when “a person is incapable of exercising her free [will];” and
fraud has five elements, which the court then listed.108 But as the court
detailed, E.L. had legal counsel, took advice from her family, and had
been told that the visitation agreement was not “a contract that we could
take to court.”109 The process was not rushed; as E.L.’s attorney testified,
“The judge spoke . . . Spanish, so . . . we would kind of back off and say,
we would kind of rest for a little while and the family would talk. It went
really slowly.”110 The affidavit of relinquishment was translated and read
to E.L. at least twice before she signed it.111 It stated, in part:
I REALIZE THAT I SHOULD NOT SIGN THIS AFFIDAVIT OF
RELINQUISHMENT IF THERE IS ANY THOUGHT IN MY MIND
THAT I MIGHT SOMEDAY SEEK TO CHANGE MY
MIND. . . . BECAUSE I REALIZE HOW IMPORTANT THIS
DECISION IS FOR THE FUTURE OF MY CHILD, I HAVE PUT
MY INITIALS BESIDE EVERY LINE OF THIS PARAGRAPH SO
THAT IT WILL ALWAYS BE UNDERSTOOD THAT I HAVE
READ THIS AFFIDAVIT OF RELINQUISHMENT, UNDERSTAND
112
IT, AND DESIRE TO SIGN IT.

Although witnesses testified as to E.L.’s anguish and fear at the
possibility of losing all contact with her child, E.L.’s own attorney
testified that the pressure on her was not “undue;” it was “just a very
emotional time.”113
Other attempts in other cases to prove duress, fraud,
misrepresentation, or coercion have been similarly unsuccessful.114 In a
105. Id. at 830.
106. Id. at 831 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 832.
108. Id. at 828-29.
109. Id. at 830-32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. at 832 (first alteration in original).
111. Id. at 831.
112. Id. at 831-32.
113. Id. at 830-31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. See In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of K.V. v. Indiana, Dep’t of Child
Servs., No. 64A04-1004-JT-236, 2011 WL 1565435, *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2011) (noting that,
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2009 case, the birth mother argued her consent should be set aside on the
ground of mutual mistake.115 The state had removed her son on grounds
of neglect; when he was eight, the mother agreed to his adoption by her
aunt and uncle.116 The parties had agreed that “should” the adoption with
the aunt and uncle be finalized, the mother would have continuing
contact rights, but their agreement had not been incorporated into the
formal relinquishment signed by the mother.117 When the adoption fell
through, the mother sought to set aside the termination of her parental
rights on the grounds that she would never have agreed to terminate had
she known that an open adoption with her aunt and uncle would not
follow.118 The court rejected the claim on the ground that her decision
“was voluntary and free from force or threat and . . . that she understood
her consent could not be withdrawn once . . . accepted by the court.”119
The court also held that there was no evidence that any mistake
regarding the conditional nature of the agreement to terminate was
mutual; “[a]lthough the parties may have anticipated an adoption by
the . . . uncle and aunt, the record [did] not support the . . . argument that
[the mother’s] consent was” conditional on the existence of open
adoption with them.120
Claims of fraud based on the failure (of someone) to properly file
the postadoption visitation agreement arise with some regularity. In a
2011 California case, Carla M. v. Susan E.,121 the birth mother, Carla,
brought an action in fraud to rescind her consent to the adoption and to
reestablish her own parental rights.122 Carla alleged that the adoptive
parents had failed to file the visitation agreement with the court, as
required by California law.123 Carla argued that she would not have
relinquished the baby without the assurance of visitation, which she
although evidence showed that all parties “contemplated that post-adoption visitation between
Mother and K.V. might be a possibility,” postadoption privileges were never guaranteed, and
mother’s consent was not obtained under duress nor was her free will overcome at the time she
signed the consent); In re Judicial Surrender of Daijuanna Priscilla M., 735 N.Y.S.2d 544, 545
(App. Div. 2002) (finding no fraud because there was no evidence that the adoptive mother never
intended to permit visitation by the birth mother and so entered the agreement in bad faith; rather,
the adoptive mother withdrew consent to visitation due to the birth mother’s “undisclosed drug
abuse”).
115. In re Christopher G., 984 A.2d 1111, 1114 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
116. Id. at 1113.
117. Id. The mother had signed and faxed the agreement to the aunt and uncle who never
returned it. Id. at 1113-14.
118. Id. at 1114.
119. Id. at 1115.
120. Id.
121. No. H035781, 2011 WL 2739649 (Cal. Ct. App. July 15, 2011).
122. Id. at *1.
123. Id. at *1, *2 n.3.

2012]

POSTADOPTION VISITATION AGREEMENTS

329

thought she had secured by signing (not filing) the agreement.124 The
court upheld the trial court’s finding that there had been no fraud; there
was no evidence that the adoptive parents had reason to believe that the
birth mother expected them to file the agreement or that it was important
to her.125 In addition, the court found that because the adoptive parents
were not in a fiduciary relationship with the birth mother, they had no
duty to file the agreement.126
Yet a closer look at the facts suggests why in this most relational of
agreements—the creation of a new family and the dismantling of an
existing one—a birth mother might well have plausible, if unactionable,
expectations about the bargain she has entered. In Carla M., Carla
contacted the adoptive mother Susan after she had read Susan’s
“prospective adoptive parent profile” at the adoption agency.127 The
profile stated, in part: “We admire your courage and love in considering
open adoption. If you choose to do this, you will . . . become a part of
our lives forever.”128 The parties then met and, over the next two months,
developed a close friendship, were in near daily contact with one
another, and were even filmed for a program on open adoption for the
Discovery Health Channel.129 Yet at the same time as all this coziness
was shaping up, Susan notified the adoption agency that she and her
husband would not sign any visitation agreement that was legally
binding and would not go through with the adoption if required to do
so.130 The agency’s adoption counselor then told Susan that if they
signed a Preliminary Agreement, they would not have to file the official
form.131 It is not hard to imagine that Carla might have misunderstood
the importance of formal filing, especially against the background of the
encouraging promise in Susan’s “prospective adoptive parent profile.”

124. Id. at *1. The agreement, signed by both parties, stated in part, “We all understand
that: . . . This is not a legally binding document, except . . . when filed with the court . . . at the time
of the finalization of the adoption.” Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). One section of the
agreement set forth the agreed-to contact, which provided for photographs to the birth mother twice
a year upon request, an annual visit between the birth parents and the child, and the initiation of
phone contact by both the birth parents and the adoptive parents. Id.
125. Id. at *9-10; see also In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of K.V. v. Indiana,
Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 64A04-1004-JT-236, 2011 WL 1565435, *4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(finding no fraud when the birth mother did not receive visitation, even though she was told she
would receive it if she voluntarily relinquished her parental rights).
126. Carla M., 2011 WL 2739649, at *9.
127. See id. at *1.
128. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at *2-3.
130. Id. at *2.
131. Id.
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A 2002 Nevada case similarly turned on the issue of filing.132 Here,
too, the birth mother relinquished her parental rights, having entered into
a “communication agreement” with the adoptive parents drafted by their
adoption agency.133 When the birth mother sought to overturn the
adoption, the adoptive parents then denied all contact.134 The birth
mother then sued for specific performance of the communication
agreement.135 The district court granted the adoptive parents’ motion to
dismiss on the grounds that state law, at the time, did not provide for
agreements regarding visitation or contact to be enforced independently
as contracts.136 Unless such a communication agreement was
incorporated into the final adoption decree—this one was not—“a
natural parent has no rights to the child.”137
Yet while holding that the birth mother had no basis for relief, the
court paused to note that:
[t]his decision leads to an unsatisfactory result in that natural parents
may consent to an adoption because, pursuant to an agreement, they
believe they have a right to post-adoption contact with the child.
However, what many of these natural parents fail to realize is that, if
the agreement is not incorporated in the adoption decree, their rights as
to the child are terminated upon adoption and any contact with the
child may be had only upon the adoptive parents’ permission,
138
regardless of the agreement.

The dissent put the case even more forcefully. Declaring the result
to be “patently unfair,” Justice Robert E. Rose observed that “[t]he
enforcement of the adoption agreement without also recognizing the
132. Birth Mother v. Adoptive Parents, 59 P.3d 1233, 1234-36 (Nev. 2002); see also Fast v.
Moore, 135 P.3d 387, 388 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (finding a visitation agreement unenforceable
because it was not court-approved at the time of adoption).
133. Birth Mother, 59 P.3d at 1234.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1234-35.
137. Id. at 1235. Whether a postadoption visitation agreement is incorporated into the final
decree of adoption also has constitutional significance should the adoptive parents relocate from one
state to another. In a North Carolina case, the birth mother and adoptive parents entered into an
agreement in Florida that was not incorporated in the Florida final decree. Quets v. Needham, 682
S.E.2d 214, 216, 218 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). The birth mother sought to have the agreement enforced
in North Carolina, where the adoptive parents had moved, and on appeal for the dismissal of her
claim and Rule 11 sanctions, the birth mother argued that North Carolina was required to give full
faith and credit to the Florida adoption decree. Id. at 218-19, 221. However, since the agreement
was not part of the decree, it was regarded merely a private contract entered into in another state
and, therefore, entitled to specific enforcement by a North Carolina court only as a matter of comity.
See id. at 222. Because postadoption visitation agreements were then unenforceable in North
Carolina, comity was not required. Id. at 223.
138. Birth Mother, 59 P.3d at 1235-36 (footnote omitted).
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contact provision leaves the biological parent with an adoption she or he
never would have agreed to otherwise. We should not permit birth
parents to be so misled.”139
Some of the problem—mothers not grasping the significance of the
incorporation of their agreement with adoptive parents into the final
adoption decree—may stem from the somewhat confusing and opaque
structure of the entire arrangement. Open adoption is not one transaction,
but three, each with distinct, if interrelated, significance. There is the
relinquishment of the natural mother’s parental rights to the state or
licensed agency; the agreement between the natural mother and the
adoptive parents; and the final decree issued by the court, into which the
private agreement must be properly folded. Certainly, the first two of
these are often executed at or around the same time, though each has its
own requirements and protocols. For example, the relinquishment must
contain clear and conspicuous language of its irrevocability, often to be
separately acknowledged by the mother through her initials or signature.
Yet it is not hard to understand how a birth mother might think that the
irrevocability that has been so pointedly brought to her attention applies
to the obligations undertaken by all parties to the transaction. She has
foresworn her parental rights forever, but the adoptive parents have also
made what might seem to be a binding promise. Civilians—which is to
say, most of us most of the time—do not dwell on the technical aspects
of our legal decisions, perhaps particularly when the decision is
emotionally loaded. In agreeing to terminate their parental rights on the
condition that some contact with the child is preserved, we can imagine
that birthmothers may not have understood that the consent to
termination is really the only thing that will stick.
VII.

A BETTER ANALOGY

In light of all this, I want to make a substitution in my earlier
analogy. I suggested at the outset that postadoption visitation agreements
were rather like prenuptial agreements. Both contracts made the
underlying endeavor, whether marriage or parenthood, possible by
articulating and settling terms of particular importance to the parties.
Having now looked more closely at the case law and roughed out the
edges of how this all works in practice, I want to suggest that the more
accurate analogy, certainly in the subset of cases involving mothers
facing the involuntary termination of parental rights, is not between

139. Id. at 1237 (Rose, J., dissenting).
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postadoption visitation agreements and prenuptial agreements, but
between postadoption visitation agreements and plea bargains.
Like plea bargains, postadoption visitation agreements are hard
decisions made under hard circumstances.140 Like prisoners rolling the
dice with regard to their liberty, mothers who are about to lose their
children have a very small range in which to operate. As one mother
testified in her unsuccessful attempt to rescind her consent:
I thought I was . . . actually, I don’t know exactly what I was doing. All
I know is that I . . . I wanted to see [A.Y.], and that I’m continuing to
see . . . I was told if I . . . if I didn’t sign them and [the trial court] took
my rights I would never see her, and if I did sign them I could.
This . . . I wasn’t really . . . I don’t know. I wasn’t thinking right. I just
want . . . I just wanted her to be happy, and I wanted her to be
141
with me.

But in addition to the enormity of what is at stake at the individual
level, aspects of plea bargains and postadoption visitation agreements
also cut across institutional aspects of family court and the criminal
justice systems. To begin, both bargains produce efficiencies that help
maintain, if not sustain in the case of plea bargains, the two systems of
adjudication. Second, in each the discretionary authority of certain
players—prosecutors in one, social workers in the other—contributes to
a default regime against which the little guys (defendants and mothers)
bargain. Third, there are special concerns about formation and
enforcement when the subject of a bargain involves the relinquishment
of constitutional rights. In the criminal context, the defendant agrees to
waive his right to a jury trial in exchange for the prosecutor’s promise of
an agreed upon sentencing recommendation to the court.142 In the family
context, the mother consents to giving up her parental rights voluntarily,
waiving the hearing that is otherwise required for an involuntary
termination.143 While the transactions are not identical in every respect, a
140. I specially thank Mark R. Shulman for suggesting this analogy to me in a discussion about
this project.
141. Youngblood v. Jefferson Cnty. Div. of Family & Children, 838 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2005) (alterations in original).
142. See generally Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). For the view that the contractual analysis is small potatoes, see generally
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992).
143. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102,
121 (1996) (“[P]arental status termination is ‘irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]’ of the most fundamental
family relationship.” (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982)) (second and third
alternations in original). The Supreme Court later addressed the constitutional significance of
parallels between criminal justice. In holding that the demands of due process required a standard of
at least “clear and convincing” evidence, the Supreme Court observed that in some states “the

2012]

POSTADOPTION VISITATION AGREEMENTS

333

comparison along these three interrelated dimensions—scope,
participants, and process—shows why plea bargains rather than prenups
are more apt for thinking about postadoption visitation agreements.
Looking first at the matter of scope, the criminal justice system is
plea bargains all the way down. Guilty pleas account for ninety-seven
percent of all convictions in federal court and ninety-four percent of
convictions in state courts.144 Robert Scott and William Stunz put the
point clearly: “[Plea bargaining] is not some adjunct to the criminal
justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”145 From the
government’s perspective, the advantages are easy to see. There is the
massive savings in administrative money and time. As the Supreme
Court has noted, “Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the
fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are
important components of this country’s criminal justice
system. . . . Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce
resources.”146 For prosecutors, there is also the win. A plea bargain
counts as a conviction, and one does not have to watch The Wire to
understand the significance of that. Indeed, plea bargaining is a win-win:
because prosecutors commonly offer defendants a plea in exchange for
testimony against any co-defendants, prosecutors are assured of “at least
one conviction while also enhancing the chances of a subsequent
conviction.”147
And what is in it for defendants? Why plead rather than take one’s
chances in court? The primary answer is that a plea produces a shorter
sentence. On average, those who go to trial get sentences three times
longer than those who agree to a plea.148 This discrepancy—the “trial
penalty”—results from legislation requiring judges to impose mandatory
minimum sentences following a conviction at trial; the statutory
minimums are overly (and intentionally) long precisely to make a plea
bargain more attractive.149 Prosecutors may also overcharge crimes,
factfinding stage of a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding bears many of the indicia of a
criminal trial.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762.
144. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, at tbl.5.24.2010, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242010.pdf.
145. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 142, at 1912.
146. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
147. Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2013).
148. Rachel Barkow, The Problem with Mandatory Minimums, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR
DEBATE (Aug. 19, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/08/19/doprosecutors-have-too-much-power/the-problem-with-mandatory-minimum-sentences.
149. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1034 (2006). Professor Rachel E. Barkow states:
[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even
Congress or the prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist
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again for the purpose of encouraging the defendant to plead guilty to
lesser offenses with shorter sentences.150
How do these features of plea bargaining play out with
postadoption visitation agreements? First, cost savings have not gone
unnoticed. In enacting its postadoption visitation statute, the State of
Maryland noted that avoiding termination hearings through voluntary
relinquishment, itself incentivized by the possibility of postadoption
contact, might result in:
significant savings in the cost of litigation related to adoption
cases. . . . For illustrative purposes only, based on the average cost of a
permanent placement for a child of $600 per month, if 100 children
achieved placement six months earlier than otherwise would have
occurred under current law, the Judiciary could achieve savings of
151
$360,000 annually.

The Supreme Court has noted with some approval that states may
“wish[] the termination decision to be made as economically as possible
and thus want[] to avoid both the expense of appointed counsel and the
cost of the lengthened proceedings his presence may cause.”152
Second, mothers do better “taking the plea”—that is, agreeing to
relinquish voluntarily—than proceeding with a termination hearing. In
the Indiana county studied by Professor Baldwin, only three out of 300
mothers prevailed in preventing the involuntarily termination of their
parental rights in actions brought by the state.153 Mothers understand
these odds. They can risk losing contact with their children forever, or
they can negotiate some form of communication under a voluntary
relinquishment.
Why mothers do badly at hearings returns us to the matter of
institutional players. As we have seen in the criminal system, prosecutors
have the discretion to decide how to charge offenses and what sort of
plea they will accept. In termination hearings, the discretion is located in
social workers or in some jurisdictions, in court appointed guardians ad
litem (“GALs”) or court appointed special advocates (“CASAs”). But as
Professor Baldwin and others have pointed out, GALs and CASAs are
on the books largely for bargaining purposes. This often results in individuals who
accept a plea bargain receiving shorter sentences than other individuals who are less
morally culpable but take a chance and go to trial.
Barkow, supra, at 1034 (footnote omitted).
150. See id. at 1044-46.
151. DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE: REVISED, S. 710, 2005 Sess.,
at 5 (Md. 2005).
152. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
153. Baldwin, supra note 87, at 272.
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often community volunteers with little or no training in child
development.154 Although their job is to represent the interests of the
child, Professor Baldwin suggests that assessments about parental ability
are often based on personal opinion or prejudice.155 In some
jurisdictions, GALs rarely meet with the children whose interests they
are assigned to represent.156 Moreover, because GALs are regarded as
neutral evaluators, rather than as witnesses for the state, they are not
subject to cross-examination by the mother’s counsel, and their views
are typically accepted by judges as the final word on what is best for any
particular child.157 In this way, the authority of GALs or CASAs, well
intentioned as they may be, casts the shadow—the one percent success
rate reported by Professor Baldwin—that makes voluntary
relinquishment by mothers a rational, if massively constrained, choice.
A third and crucial feature in common between plea bargaining and
postadoption visitation agreements are their constitutional implications.
This aspect of the bargain has been clearly recognized in the criminal
context, where the Supreme Court has invoked both the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial and the Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process to uphold a plea bargain.158 If the state breaches—say, by
154. Id. at 281-89; George H. Russ, The Child’s Right to Be Heard, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING
POVERTY 305, 308 (1998) (“[I]n most jurisdictions these individuals are typically not attorneys, they
do not have adequate training, and they often do not have any idea what children are all about or
how to deal with them.”); Hollis R. Peterson, Comment, In Search of the Best Interests of the Child:
The Efficacy of the Court Appointed Special Advocate Model of Guardian Ad Litem Representation,
13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1083, 1083, 1097-100 (2006) (“[M]any guardians ad litem have very little
training or education in children and families, receive little compensation for their work, and often
are reported to provide substandard representation to their child clients.”).
155. Baldwin, supra note 87, at 281-82.
156. “A 2000 study of Colorado GALs indicated that in forty-one percent of cases, the GAL
did not meet with the child,” and a 2007 study of Ohio GALs, showed that while ninety percent of
attorneys indicated that they nearly always met with the children face-to-face, only sixty-three
percent of them documented these meetings. Barbara Glesner Fines, Pressures Toward Mediocrity
in the Representation of Children, 37 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 411, 428 (2008) (“Even fewer attorneys
observed the child interact[ing] with [his or her] parent[s]: eighty-two percent reported they did so
[but] only forty-one percent documented these observations.”)
157. Raven C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian Ad Litem in Child Custody
Cases: The Contours of Our Judicial System Stretched Beyond Recognition, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV.
255, 257-58 (1998) (noting that attorneys warn clients to cooperate with GALs because their
recommendations carry such weight with the court).
158. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971); Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d
1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262) (“[The defendant]’s due process
rights conferred by the federal constitution allow [him] to enforce the terms of the plea
agreement.”). As the Court explained in Mabry v. Johnson:
A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere
executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive
an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest. It is the ensuing
guilty plea that implicates the Constitution. Only after respondent pleaded guilty was he
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failing to make the promised sentencing recommendation—the
defendant may either seek specific performance or withdraw his plea.159
A plea bargain may also be set aside if the bargaining process is found to
be sufficiently unfair. In State v. Nichols,160 for example, the court
held that:
where the responsible arms of the judicial and law enforcement
establishment, together with defendant’s own counsel, have
misinformed him as to a material element of a plea negotiation, which
the defendant has relied thereon in entering his plea, as we conclude
was here the case, it would be manifestly unjust to hold the defendant
161
to his plea.

More typical, however, is Allen v. State.162 There, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that a defendant who sought to withdraw a guilty
plea because both his public defender and the trial court judge
misinformed him about the range of punishment he should expect if
convicted at trial—they told him three to thirty years when the range was
three to fifteen years—“ha[d] failed to demonstrate that he suffered
manifest injustice.”163
How do these issues play out in the context of postadoption
visitation agreements? A few courts have acknowledged their
constitutional dimensions. In T.B. v Indiana Department of Child
Services,164 for example, the state moved for termination of the mother’s
visitation on grounds of the children’s best interests, but the mother
received no notice of the hearing.165 The court held this amounted to a
denial of her due process rights and remanded the case for a hearing on
the merits.166 The concern was also raised by the dissent in the Texas
D.E.H. case.167 Recall that in that case, unlike the sympathetic Corina,
the most unsympathetic E.L. was not able to unwind her
convicted, and it is that conviction which gave rise to the deprivation of respondent’s
liberty at issue here.
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984) (footnote omitted).
159. See United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plea bargain
may be enforced through specific performance or the defendant may be permitted to withdraw her
guilty plea.” (citations omitted)).
160. 365 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1976).
161. Id. at 468; see also Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 9 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012)
(holding that defense counsel must at least inform clients of any formal plea offers that may be
favorable to the accused).
162. 509 A.2d 87 (Del. 1986).
163. Id. at 87-88.
164. 921 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 2009).
165. Id. at 497.
166. Id. at 498, 502.
167. In re D.E.H., 301 S.W.3d 825, 832 (Tex. App. 2009) (Livingston, J., dissenting).
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relinquishment.168 But dissenting Judge Terrie Livingston stated that the
involuntary termination of parental rights is a decision of constitutional
significance.169 The evidence regarding the knowing and voluntary
nature of the consent should therefore be “clear and convincing.”170
Judge Livingston noted that in D.E.H., E.L.’s Spanish-speaking therapist
testified that E.L. “signed the agreement because she thought it was
irrevocable and would ensure her lifetime visitation.”171
In that case, there were also indications that DFPS was less than
forthcoming regarding its involvement in the process and about who said
what when. For example, the DFPS attorney testified, somewhat
technically, that “[E.L.] was not misled into believing any promises were
given to her from the Department at any point. We were not part of
any of the mediation proceedings in that we were not in the room
with her.”172
Here it is worth remembering that ineffective assistance of counsel
in a criminal case may serve as grounds for the defendant revoking the
plea.173 Indeed, in two recent cases, the Supreme Court extended the
right to effective counsel to cover situations in which the defendant’s
lawyer gave bad advice about particular pleas that were later rejected by
the defendant.174
Might this be a promising development for mothers who seek to
withdraw their consent to termination when the adoptive parents
discontinue visitation? Not entirely. To begin, unlike a criminal
prosecution where the defendant’s liberty is at stake, there is no
entitlement to appointed counsel in termination proceedings, which
involve the loss of one’s children, not one’s liberty.175 As the Court
made clear in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,176 “as a

168. See supra text accompanying notes 91-113.
169. D.E.H., 301 S.W.3d at 833.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 835.
172. Id. at 835-36.
173. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
174. See Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 14-16 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (allowing
challenge to conviction when defendant was advised not to take favorable plea based on incorrect
legal advice); Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 13-15 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (allowing
challenge when defendant was not told about a favorable plea he could prove he would have
accepted).
175. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (“The pre-eminent generalization
that emerges from this Court’s precedents on an indigent's right to appointed counsel is that such a
right has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the
litigation.”).
176. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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litigant’s interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to
appointed counsel.”177
Nonetheless, forty-three states have provided for appointed counsel
for indigent parents in termination proceedings.178 In those states, might
parents who have been insufficiently advised about the nature of the
entire transaction have a claim parallel to the ineffective assistance of
counsel in the criminal setting? Like the remedies available to criminal
defendants whose plea deals are breached by the state, should not parents
too be entitled to either withdraw their consent to the termination of
their parental rights or alternatively seek specific performance of the
visitation contract?
I have my doubts. Unlike a plea bargain, the state itself has not
promised the relinquishing mother continued visitation.179 That
agreement turns out to have been something like a side deal between
mother and adoptive parents. The state has neither made nor breached
any contractual undertaking; it has, in a sense, simply sponsored the
arrangement, providing both the impetus and the forum.
In addition, while both state and criminal defendant have an interest
in the integrity of the plea bargaining process, it is well established that
the state has an independent interest in the welfare of children that is not
necessarily aligned with the parents’.180 As with other contractual
arrangements concerning children, such as custody agreements upon
divorce, the best interests of the child dominate over all other concerns
and the state retains continuing jurisdiction to secure those interests. For
these reasons, when compared with postadoption visitation agreements,
177. Id. at 26. To be sure, the Court noted somewhat guiltily that its decision “no way implies
that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now widely followed by the
States are other than enlightened and wise.” Id. at 34.
178. Wendy C. Sotolongo, The Importance of the Right to Counsel in an
Abuse/Neglect/Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in North Carolina,
N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS. (April 2011), http://www.ncids.org/ParentRepresentation/
News_Updates/ImportanceRightToCounsel.pdf; cf. Table of Civil Right-to-Counsel Statutes, NAT’L
COAL. FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/pdfs/abelchart.pdf (last
visited Mar. 29, 2013).
179. To be sure, like a postadoption visitation agreement, a plea bargain must also be
incorporated into the court’s judgment. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984).
180. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (“Two state interests are at stake in
parental rights termination proceedings—a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the
welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such
proceedings.”). In Lassiter, the Court also observed:
The State’s interests [in a termination hearing], however, clearly diverge from the
parent’s insofar as the State wishes the termination decision to be made as economically
as possible and thus wants to avoid both the expense of appointed counsel and the cost of
the lengthened proceedings his presence may cause.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28.
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the rights given up contractually in a plea bargain appear more
delineated, more susceptible to remedy, and more located in the
Constitution’s core amendments.
Nonetheless, it would seem that greater judicial awareness of how
postadoption visitation agreements connect to the larger scheme of
voluntary relinquishment is in order. Maybe the DFPS should have been
“in the room with the mother” in a case like D.E.H. where obtaining the
mother’s consent to termination is slipstreaming behind a visitation
contract which she thinks—justifiably, I would say—is binding.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

My focus has been on the circumstances under which postadoption
visitation agreements are entered and the circumstances under which
they are enforced. Whether an analogy to plea bargains or to prenuptial
agreements is more apt may be a matter of maternal circumstance. In
cases where adoption is actively, even if reluctantly, sought by the
mother—the heroic birth mother doing the best for everyone—the logic
of open adoption is clear. In contrast, in cases where a mother’s children
have already been removed and termination looms, open adoption and
the promise of visitation scan quite differently.
Of course, the cases do not fall so neatly into discrete stacks; there
are certainly cases where advantage seems to be taken even of heroic
mothers. Although good mothers appear more regularly in infant
adoption (and certainly in the agency marketing literature that now
surrounds it), and bad ones appear more regularly in terminations
involving older children, the cases are a mix of both. And while coercion
seems apparent in the termination cases, pressure, if not full-out
coercion, is often at play in infant adoption, too.
Yet, it seems clear that there are important differences in how
postadoption visitation agreements are used and regarded depending
where in the tricky constellation of motherhood the birth mother finds
herself. These bargains look one way when sought by birth mothers who
have considered their options and are satisfied with the slice of relational
association that visitation or progress reports provide. They look quite
different to mothers for whom open adoption is simply the least
worst choice.

